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How “Profit Sharing” are they? Profit Sharing Investment Accounts 
in Islamic Banks 
Perspective of Corporate Governance and Ethical Issues 
Salah Al Hammadi, Simon Archer1, Rifaat Ahmed Abdel Karim and Carol Padgett  
 
ABSTRACT 
Islamic banks (IBs) cannot pay or receive interest. Hence, in lieu of conventional 
interest-bearing deposit accounts, they commonly offer a type of account, an 
“investment account”, the holders of which are paid a share of the profits earned 
by the bank on the assets funded by their deposits. The contractual basis of these 
investment accounts is an Islamic contract known as Mudarabah, which is a type 
of partnership between one or more providers of funds (known as the Rabb al Mal) 
as sleeping partners and a managing partner (known as the Mudarib) (in this case 
the bank) who is the active partner and invests time and effort but does not provide 
funds. Having no funds invested, the Mudarib is not exposed to financial losses, but 
may lose his time and efforts (an opportunity loss). The sleeping partners are, by 
contrast, exposed to losses on the assets financed by their funds, unlike 
conventional depositors who are only exposed to losses if the bank becomes 
insolvent. This use of the Mudarabah raises some thorny issues of corporate 
governance, regulation and the equitable treatment of unrestricted investment 
account holders (UIAH), who as profit-sharing and loss bearing stakeholders in 
IBs are nevertheless without any governance rights. The bank’s policies, as set by 
its board of directors, are likely to reflect the risk-return preferences of its 
shareholders, who hold governance rights, rather than those of its UIAH. The 
former will typically have a significantly greater risk appetite than the latter. Given 
the prevalence of commingling by IBs of Mudarabah funds with shareholders’ own 
funds and other funds under the bank’s control on which it earns profits for 
shareholders (such as those of current accounts), this raises an issue of the extent 
to which asset allocation reflects the preferences of UIAH. The issue of the 
equitable treatment of UIAH is not merely one of corporate governance but also 
one of business ethics. An analysis presented in this paper of financial data from a 
substantial sample of Islamic banks indicates that the concept of “profit sharing” 
tends to be stretched by IBs, exercising the discretion given to them by the form of 
Mudarabah that they use, to a point where it is questionable whether the term 
“profit sharing” is really appropriate, and whether the UIAH are treated equitably 
in a significant proportion of cases.  
                                                 
 
1 Corresponding author (s.archer@blueyonder.co.uk). This paper is substantially based on a thesis submitted by 
Salah Al Hammadi as a PhD candidate at the ICMA Centre, Henley Business School, University of Reading, 
UK, supervised by Simon Archer and Carol Padgett. Rifaat A A Karim is a Visiting Professor at the ICMA 
Centre. 
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1. Introduction 
Islamic Banks (IBs) have developed Profit Sharing Investment Accounts (PSIA) for customers’ 
savings and repository accounts in place of conventional interest-bearing deposit accounts, in 
order to mobilise funds on which IBs and their customers can earn Shari’ah-compliant returns 
(Archer et al., 2010). Customers deposit their funds in so-called “profit sharing investment 
accounts” as capital providers, and the bank invests these funds on the customers’ behalf in 
return for a share of the profit or for a fee as remuneration for management. There are two types 
of PSIAs: 
1. A restricted profit sharing investment account (RPSIA), a separately managed fund that 
is not commingled with other funds of the IB. This is similar to mutual funds and is 
generally considered by Islamic banks for the purpose of financial reporting as “off 
balance sheet funds” under management. 
2. An unrestricted profit sharing investment account (UPSIA) is an account such that an 
Islamic bank has full discretion to utilise and invest the UPSIA funds. These accounts 
are widely used by IBs in place of conventional interest-bearing deposits. 
The contractual bases for these types of account are the Mudarabah or Wakalah contracts, 
where in a Mudarabah the customers as Rabb al Mal (provide capital) and the bank provides 
work as Mudarib (entrepreneur or asset manager) and shares profit, or the bank in Wakalah 
acts as Wakeel (agent) and receives a fee plus (typically) a performance related  bonus (Archer 
et al., 1998). 
The Mudarabah contract, like the Commenda contract used by medieval Italian traders, was 
used originally for financing trade ventures in which the trader purchased a cargo which was 
transported by ship or caravan to a destination where the goods were sold and other goods 
might be purchased for sale in the home market. The profit on these transactions was divided 
between the sleeping partners (financiers) and the trader according to contractually agreed 
ratios. Rich financiers could diversify their risk by investing in a number of such ventures, as 
losses might naturally occur.   
In such circumstances, it was normal that the financiers should be sleeping partners, as they 
were not in a position to play an active role in the venture. Moreover, each Mudarabah (or 
Commenda) was a one-off venture with a final settling-up between the partners at its 
conclusion.      
IBs have adapted this form of contract to be the basis of  “investment” products which comply 
with the Islamic (Shari’ah) prohibition of interest. A Mudarabah used for this purpose is not a 
one-off venture, but may continue for an extended period so long as the account holder keeps 
funds in the account. One such adaptation has been the product developed as a Shari’ah 
compliant alternative to the conventional interest-bearing deposit account which is generally 
known as the Unrestricted Profit Sharing Investment Account (UPSIA), because the contract 
gives the bank an unrestricted mandate to invest the funds as it sees fit. Normally, the bank 
commingles the assets financed by the Mudarabah with the other assets on its balance sheet. 
Thus, the asset risk of the combined pool is shared between the shareholders and the 
Unrestricted Investment Account Holders (UIAH) pro-rata to the respective amounts of funds. 
The nearest parallel to this in conventional banking (albeit without commingling) is private 
banking investment accounts offered to so-called High Net Worth Individuals (HNWI) who 
typically have a certain appetite for risk if the potential return is high. However, the customers 
using UPSIA (UIAH) are typically far from having the risk-return preferences of HNWI, and 
would normally seek a low-risk low-return deposit-like account. 
3 
 
Hence, as we explain further below, this adaptation of the Mudarabah raises some thorny issues 
of corporate governance, regulation and the equitable treatment of UIAH, who as profit-sharing 
and loss bearing stakeholders in IBs are nevertheless without any governance rights (see 
Archer, Al-Deehani and Karim 1998) – a serious anomaly, as Williamson’s (1996) analysis 
implies. The bank’s policies, as set by its board of directors, are likely to reflect the risk-return 
preferences of its shareholders, who hold governance rights, rather than those of its UIAH. The 
former will typically have a significantly greater risk appetite than the latter. Given the 
prevalence of commingling, this raises an issue of the extent to which asset allocation reflects 
the preferences of UIAH.  
The issue of equitable treatment of UIAH is not merely one of corporate governance but also 
one of business ethics. As it happens, analysis of financial data from a substantial sample of 
Islamic banks indicates that the concept of “profit sharing” tends to be stretched by IBs, 
exercising the discretion given to them by the form of Mudarabah that they use, to a point 
where it is questionable whether the term “profit sharing” is really appropriate, and whether 
the UIAH are treated equitably in a significant proportion of cases.   
The rest of this paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 explains in more detail how UPSIA 
are used by IBs as an Islamic (i.e. Shari’ah compliant) alternative to conventional deposit 
accounts. Section 3 is a brief literature review. Sections 4 and 5 describe an empirical study of 
profit sharing applied to UPSIA as practiced by a substantial sample of IBs: first by comparing 
the rates of return paid to shareholders (return on equity - ROE) and to UIAH (return on balance 
invested) on a risk-adjusted basis, i.e. taking account of the variability (standard deviation) of 
the respective rates of return; secondly by analysing the extent to which the differences between 
the shareholders’ ROE and the UIAHs’ rates of return can be explained by a set of corporate 
governance and financial variables. This is continued in Section 6 by a similar analysis of risk-
adjusted rates of return, but focussing on the shareholders’ dividend yields rather than on return 
on equity. Section 7 sets out our conclusions.   
2. UPSIA as an Alternative to Conventional Deposit Accounts   
IBs operate in accordance with Islamic religious law (the Shari’ah), and to this end they employ 
a number of contractual forms which are set out in Islamic commercial jurisprudence (Fiqh al 
Muamalat) and are known as the ‘nominate contracts’. One of these is the Mudarabah, which 
they have adapted to provide an alternative to conventional interest-bearing deposit accounts, 
as described in Section 1.   
The basic adaptation is that, whereas the traditional Mudarabah was used for financing one-
off ventures which concluded with a single, final profit calculation, the IBs employ it for 
financing ongoing fund management activities which involve periodic (e.g. monthly, quarterly 
or annual) profit calculations. This raises, inter alia, the issue of the treatment of unrealised 
gains and losses.  
In addition, as noted above, the assets financed by the funds of the Mudarabah are typically 
commingled in a pool with the other assets managed by the IB which appear on its balance 
sheet, namely the assets financed by the funds of current account holders and the shareholders’ 
funds. Thus, the UIAH are exposed to the same asset risk as the shareholders.  
A further, and crucial, adaptation is the practice of “smoothing” the returns payable to the 
UIAH, so that they resemble more closely the returns on conventional deposit accounts. This 
is achieved by using two types of method. In the first place, the contractual Mudarib share of 
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income from the Mudarabah is set at a high level, in some cases as high as 70% or even higher2. 
This gives the IB as Mudarib the scope to take a lower share if the Mudarabah income is low, 
in order to avoid paying a very low return to the UIAH. This practice has the effect of increasing 
the variability or riskiness of the shareholders’ returns while reducing that of the UIAHs’ 
returns, an effect known as Displaced Commercial Risk (DCR)3.  
Secondly, IBs use two types of reserve accounts to which transfers may be made in the more 
profitable years, thus reducing the distributable profits, and from which transfers may be made 
to increase distributable profits in poor years. These reserve accounts are generally known as 
the Profit Equalisation Reserve (PER – a misleading term as it is only the distributable profits 
which are smoothed) and the Investment Risk Reserve (IRR)4. With the exception of IBs in a 
few countries, the transfers into and out of these reserve accounts are not disclosed in IBs’ 
financial statements, so that there is a lack of transparency with respect to the underlying profit 
performance. 
Some national banking supervisors encourage such practices, and make it clear to IBs that they 
do not expect any losses to be passed on to UIAH. This can be avoided by use of the IRR 
provided the balance on this account is sufficient. The rules of the Mudarabah contract do not 
permit the Mudarib to cover losses to the UIAH by making transfers from shareholders’ profits 
or reserves. 
In 2014, Bank Negara Malaysia (BMN – the country’s central bank), which used to be one 
such supervisor, changed its policy regarding “profit smoothing practices”.  These are now 
prohibited by paragraph 13.5 of the BNM’s March 2014 Policy Document Investment Account, 
issued following the passage of the Malaysian Islamic Financial Services Act 2013. It is not 
clear that this change has been welcomed by the market, since there has been an increasing use 
of an alternative form of deposit account, based on Commodity Murabahah Transactions 
(CMT). CMT-based term deposits are placed by a customer who undertakes to purchase an 
amount of a commodity of a certain value which it then sells to the IB on credit for a specified 
term by means of Murabahah, with a mark-up. The IB then sells the commodity in the spot 
market for cash to generate the deposit.  The Murabahah mark-up constitutes the provider of 
funds’ return on the funds.  Such transactions do not meet with the approval of a number of 
Shari’ah scholars (acknowledged experts in Shari’ah law), but are approved by those in some 
countries, including Malaysia.  
3. Literature Review 
There is hardly any empirical literature on the practice of profit sharing by IBs. Al-Sadah 
(2008), examined the corporate governance of IBs, including its effects on the practice of profit 
sharing, using in-depth case studies of 3 IBs. His findings were consistent with the description 
in Section 2 of the practice of “smoothing” and the exercise of discretion by IBs’ management 
in “managing” the share of profits paid to UIAH. Alaeddin (2015), examines the effectiveness 
                                                 
 
2 In 2014 and 2015 Bahrain Islamic Bank (BIB) charged 85% as Mudarib share. This was reduced in 2016 to 
56.88%. (Source: BIB annual reports.) 
3 This terminology was first coined by Simon Archer and R A A Karim when the latter was the Secretary-General 
of Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) and S Archer was a 
consultant to it. 
4 The terminology of both reserves was first coined by Simon Archer and R A A Karim when the latter was the 
Secretary-General of Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) and S 
Archer was a consultant to it. 
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of market discipline with respect to UPSIA, in terms of UIAHs withdrawing or increasing their 
deposits in an IB in response to changes in the CAMEL ratios of the bank. His findings 
suggested that, while market discipline is ineffective, when the change in the ratios is 
unfavourable IB managers use the information they have about the bank’s fundamentals to 
offer higher rates to the UPSIA holders in order to curb potential withdrawals.  
In contrast, there is a fair amount of theoretical literature on the subject. Al-Deehani et al. 
(1999)5 first drew attention to the benefits to shareholders in IBs of the banks being able to use 
UPSIA as a form of leverage that does not expose them to the risks of leverage in the form of 
debt. Following from that, Archer et al. (1998), pointed out the corporate governance 
implications of this state of affairs from the perspectives of agency and transactions costs 
theories. Archer et al. (2010) further analyse the implications from the perspectives of the 
supervision, regulation and capital adequacy of IBs. Sundararajan (2011), focusses on the 
“management” of profit sharing and of DCR in IBs. Hamza (2016), examined the compliance 
of investment deposit returns with the profit and loss sharing principle using a pooled 
regression model applied to a panel of sixty Islamic banks during the period 2004-2012, finding 
that the management of investment deposits and assets financed by profit and loss sharing 
(PLS) accounts (i.e. PSIA)6 is characterized by morally hazardous behaviour and excessive risk 
taking. 
Diaw and Mbow (2011), found that the rate of return to UIAHs is correlated with the 
corresponding conventional interest rate. Their study includes a comparison of UIAHs’ rates 
of return and local interest rates and shows that the means and standard deviations of these are 
similar. The impression is given that IBs are looking at the conventional bank interest rate and 
trying to match to it the rate of payout to the UIAHs, regardless of the profit they make. For 
example, if the bank makes a high profit for the year, it will allocate the maximum Mudarib 
share to its shareholders and possibly transfer part of the profit to reserves such as PERs or 
IRRs so as to match the market (interest) rate of payout. The reserves are used at the 
management’s discretion to increase the UIAHs’ payouts for the years with lower profits. This 
use of reserves will penalise UIAHs, who are denied the return they could have been paid in a 
year of high profits, unless they keep their account until there is a year of poor results, when 
funds are released from the reserves to increase the amount available for UIAHs’ payouts. Such 
practices, and the lack of transparency surrounding them, are problematic from a corporate 
governance perspective. 
No review of the literature on the subject would be complete without a mention of the relevant 
publications of the Islamic Financial Services Board. These include IFSB-3 (2006), Guiding 
Principles on Corporate Governance for Institutions Offering only Islamic Financial Services 
(2006), IFSB-4 Disclosures to Promote Transparency and Market Discipline for Institutions 
Offering Islamic Financial Services (2007), IFSB-9 Guiding Principles on Conduct of Business 
for Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services (2009) and GN-3 Guidance Note of the 
Practice of Smoothing the Profits Payout to Investment Account Holders (2010).7 These 
publications highlight the moral hazard issues arising from the UIAHs’ lack of governance 
rights in the presence of potential conflicts of interest between UIAH and shareholders.  
                                                 
 
5 This paper was first presented as a working paper in 1996 at the University of Birmingham, UK. 
6 Strictly speaking, such accounts are better characterised as ‘profit sharing and loss bearing’, since (as 
explained above) the Mudarib does not share in the account holders’ losses. 
7 All these publications were promulgated during the time when R A A Karim was the Secretary-General of the 
IFSB and S. Archer was a consultant to these projects. 
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IFSB-3 proposes that IBs set up a Governance Committee to mitigate the moral hazard, and 
IFSB-4 focusses on the need for greater transparency to enable UIAH to make better-informed 
decisions about their PSIA. IFSB-9 states, among others, Principal 1 Truth, Honesty and 
Fairness, which requires an IB or other Islamic financial institution to “aspire to the highest 
standards of truthfulness, honesty and fairness in all its statements and dealings and [to] treat 
its customers fairly”, and  Principal 6 Conflicts of Interest and of Duty, whereby an IB or other 
Islamic financial institution is required to “recognise the conflicts of interest between it and its 
clients that arise from the types of products that it offers, and either avoid them or disclose and 
manage them, bearing in mind its fiduciary duties to investment account holders as well as 
shareholders.”  GN-3 describes the practice of smoothing the profit payouts and draws attention 
to the general lack of transparency on the part of IBs concerning the practice.     
In principle, one would expect UIAHs as profit-sharing investors to earn a risk-adjusted rate of 
return on their capital not substantially inferior to that earned by shareholders. Therefore, the 
research tries to identify the implications for CG of UPSIAs from a practical point of view, and 
through certain theoretical issues, since CG is concentrated in four key principles: justice or 
integrity, responsibility, accountability and transparency (Hasan, 2009). 
While some problems are common to financial institutions, IBs raise specific CG issues, in 
particular with respect to asset allocation, risk appetite, transparency in financial reporting, and 
potential conflicts of interest between shareholders and UIAHs. The funds of shareholders and 
UIAHs face the same underlying asset risk in so far as their funds are commingled with those 
of current accounts8 to finance the same pool of assets, and so they raise some concerns 
regarding governance rights. Therefore, the motivation for this research is concern about the 
practices of IBs in these areas, which raise specific CG issues that cannot be mitigated within 
the current regulations. The research also casts light on some severe anomalies in the treatment 
of UIAHs, which call for urgent reform of the CG of IBs. This implies that IBs have unique 
CG requirements that fit their business model and reflect the need to function effectively to 
address the issues concerning UIAHs. 
All of this literature points to a clear need for a more extensive empirical investigation of IBs’ 
profit sharing practices from a corporate governance and also from an ethical perspective. 
4. An Empirical Study of Profit-Sharing Practices applied to UPSIA 
 Introduction 
The study used a sample of 28 IBs in 4 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)9 countries plus 
Malaysia, as follows: 
Bahrain  6 
Kuwait 4 
Qatar   2 
UAE   4 
Malaysia  12 
 
                                                 
 
8 The bank (i.e. the shareholders) receives the returns and bears the risks on assets funded by current accounts.  
9 We are only considering retail IBs that provide UPSIAs; for example, in Kuwait there are five IBs, and we are 
using four of them, since Warba Bank has only recently been established and would not have sufficient data for 
comparison. Therefore, the four IBs represent 100% of listed IBs in the Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE), since 
Warba Bank was not listed in the KSE until 2013. 
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These countries were chosen because they account for a substantial proportion of Islamic 
banking assets worldwide, around 70% according to Ernst & Young (2016). The IBs chosen 
are in most cases the largest in these countries. Three of the IBs were in the Kuwait Finance 
House group: the parent bank in Kuwait and its subsidiaries in Bahrain and Malaysia. 
Data for these banks were obtained from the Bankscope and Bloomberg databases and, where 
necessary, from the banks’ annual reports. 
 
The data were used to perform three different analyses: 
1. A cross-sectional comparison of risk-adjusted rates of return earned by shareholders 
and UIAH, respectively. Risk-adjustment was made using the Coefficients of Variation 
(CVs) of the respective rates of return. Shareholders’ rates of return were their annual 
Returns on Equity (ROE), while UIAH rates of return were their annual profit payouts 
divided by the average balance of capital for the year. It should be noted that profits 
attributable to UIAH (after transfers into or out of PER or IRR) are paid out, while 
profits attributable to shareholders which are used to calculate ROE are in many cases 
only partially paid out as dividends. However, this analysis focussed on profit sharing, 
with the objective of ascertaining how the risk-adjusted rates of the return of the two 
categories of stakeholders compared. In general, the rates of return of UIAH are much 
lower than the ROEs of the shareholders. One justification offered for this is that the 
former are less risky (i.e. less volatile) than the latter, because of the widely-practiced 
“smoothing”.  In fact, our analysis shows that this is not true for more than one-third of 
the sample banks, i.e. for these 9 banks the risk-adjusted return of the UIAH is lower 
than that of the shareholders as measured by the ROE. It would therefore seem that, for 
these banks at least, UIAH are not being treated equitably in terms of profit sharing.10 
 
2. A panel data analysis of the differences between the shareholders’ ROEs and the 
UIAHs’ rates of return as the dependent variable and a number of corporate governance 
(CG) and other variables as the independent variables. A correlation analysis showed 
that there was a correlation coefficient of about 60% between the amounts of these 
differences in rates of return and the differences in risk-adjusted returns calculated in 
the preceding part of the study. Our hypothesis was that CG would have an influence 
on the size of these differences, i.e. stronger CG would be associated with smaller 
differences. It appeared that while some of the CG variables did indeed have a small 
influence in this direction, the largest driver of the differences was the bank’s Return 
on Average Assets (ROAA). Specifically, the larger the ROAA, the larger the 
                                                 
 
10 In comparing the returns of shareholders and UIAH, one has to take into consideration the following factors, (see Karim 
(2008)): 
1. The Mudarib share that the shareholders receive. 
2. In the absence of commingling, UIAH do not partake in the returns of all the assets, but only of those which 
are included in the Mudarabah and are financed by their funds. 
3. Shareholders, because they guarantee the funds deposited in current accounts, are the sole recipients of any 
returns generated from investing the excess in these funds.  Shareholders, at their own discretion, may donate 
part of the returns from the current accounts to UPSIA, as is the case in Kuwait Finance House. 
4. The Shari'ah fatwas followed by Islamic banks, such as those pertaining to determining the Mudarabah 
expenses and revenues and specifying the sources of funds which should be given priority in investment in 
cases where it is not possible to invest all the Mudarabah funds. 
5. The accounting methods used by the Islamic bank to recognize the profits of investment instrument transactions 
and the methods of recognising asset re-measurement gains and losses.   
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difference, indicating that in the more profitable years the shareholders benefited 
proportionately much more than the UIAH. This, again, had negative implications for 
the fairness of profit sharing between shareholders and UIAH in IBs.  
 
3. The third analysis was a comparison of the shareholders’ dividend yields and the 
UIAHs’ rates of return on a risk- adjusted basis, making risk adjustments using the CVs. 
Dividend yield data were available for only 20 of the IBs. Again, the results were such 
as to raise questions regarding the fairness of the treatment of UIAH, since in 7 out of 
the 20 cases the CV of the UIAH’s rate of return was greater (i.e. the risk-adjusted rate 
of return was lower) than that of the shareholders’ dividend yield, while the overall 
mean rate of payout to UIAH was 110 basis points lower than the overall mean dividend 
yield.   
 
 
We did not examine shareholders’ stock market returns, which are a commonly used measure 
where firms’ shares are traded in efficient markets, because not all of our sample banks were 
listed and for those that were listed, the GCC markets have been shown to be not even weak-
form efficient. 
 
 Comparative Analysis of Risk-Adjusted Rates of Return 
Table 1 below sets out the CVs of the rates of return for shareholders and UIAH for the 28 IBs 
for the period 2002-2016. Table 2 and Table 3 show the results of t-tests for the rates of return 
and the CVs. These tables are taken from Al Hammadi (2016).  
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Table 1: Adjusted Coefficients of Variation 
Bank per Jurisdiction ROE Outliers  Adjusted CV Obs. 
Bahrain Shareholders UIAH Shareholders UIAH  
Albaraka Islamic Bank -610%* 39% 90% 39% 9 
AlSalam Bank 70% 104% 70% 104%** 11 
Bahrain Islamic Bank 1769%* 21% 78% 21% 15 
Ithmaar Bank -4910%* 26% 164% 26% 13 
Khaleeji Commercial 194% 34% 111% 34% 12 
KFHB 108% 42% 108% 42% 15 
Kuwait      
Ahli United 16% 33% 16% 33%** 7 
Boubyan 573%* 59% 67% 59% 12 
KFH 56% 59% 56% 59%** 15 
KIB 68% 39% 48% 39% 11 
Qatar      
Masraf Al Rayan 12% 72% 12% 72%** 10 
Qatar Islamic Bank 41% 51% 41% 51%** 15 
UAE      
Abu Dhabi Islamic 41% 87% 41% 87%** 13 
Dubai Islamic Bank 40% 57% 40% 57%** 15 
Emirates Islamic Bank 135% 57% 96% 57% 13 
Sharjah Islamic Bank 28% 43% 28% 43%** 12 
Malaysia      
Affin Islamic Bank Berhad 29% 20% 29% 20% 10 
Alliance Islamic Bank Berhad 51% 29% 51% 29% 10 
Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad -577%* 34% 102% 34% 15 
Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad 75% 15% 52% 15% 15 
CIMB Islamic Bank Berhad 100% 35% 54% 35% 12 
Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad 27% 17% 27% 17% 11 
KFHM -838%* 46% 112% 46% 12 
Maybank Islamic Berhad 32% 38% 32% 38%** 9 
OCBC Al-Amin Bank Berhad 56% 37% 54% 37% 9 
Public Islamic Bank Berhad 38% 40% 38% 40%** 9 
RHB Islamic Bank Berhad 28% 23% 28% 23% 12 
Standard Chartered Saadiq Berhad 68% 42% 68% 42% 9 
Note that there must be a positive result for CV for a meaningful comparison to be possible; however, there are 
some outliers in the ROE that affect the CV calculation, which need to be adjusted. Those flagged * represent 
return on average equity outliners, the shareholders’ negative returns (outliers) were replaced with zeros. For those 
flagged ** (ten cases) the UIAHs have CVs higher than shareholders’. This indicates that UIAHs have a lower 
level of risk-adjusted rate of return. Hence, it would appear that UIAHs are not being treated fairly in these ten 
cases. 
 
 
These coefficients of variation, and the rates of return in Table 2 and Table 3 below, were 
calculated after treating all negative ROEs as outliers and replacing them with zeroes. Where 
the overall ROE for a bank is negative, as it was in 4 cases, the CV is also negative, which 
cannot be interpreted. However, in some cases there were negative ROEs for some years but 
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the overall ROE was positive; there were 20 such cases. We nevertheless replaced these 
negative ROEs with zeroes for the tables in question, but there was no change to the 
classification of the CV results when compared to those where only the overall ROEs were 
replaced with zeroes. In total, therefore, 27 negative ROEs were replaced with zeroes, out of 
329 observations. 
It was considered preferable to treat all negative ROEs as outliers11, not just those that resulted 
in negative CVs, for two reasons: 
1. It is better to avoid the very large positive CVs that are obtained when negative ROEs 
result in a very small overall mean return for a bank. These very large positive CVs are 
outliers that distort the data. 
2. There were no negative returns for UPSIAs when the bank had a negative return on 
investment, underlying losses being ‘smoothed’ by the use of IRRs. Hence, removing 
all negative ROEs makes the CVs of shareholders and UIAHs more comparable. 
 
Table 2: Shareholders’ and UIAHs’ adjusted 
rates of return 2002–2016 
 t-Test: adjusted Rates of Return Shareholders UIAHs 
Mean 0.11 0.03 
Variance 0.00 0.00 
Banks 28 28 
Level of Significance 0.05  
t Stat 8.76  
P-Value 0.00**  
Standard Deviation 0.045 0.006 
Coefficient of Variation 0.43 0.19 
Note: P-value is smaller than the significance level of α of 5% and 
the test statistic is high, both of which indicate that there is a 
significant difference in mean rates of return between the two 
classes of stakeholders. We may note, however, that the mean rate 
of ROE of shareholders on the adjusted basis in this table is 11%, as 
opposed to 8% when only overall negative mean ROEs are adjusted 
to zero.  
  
                                                 
 
11 This method was used by Diaw and Mbow (2011). 
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Table 3: T-test for the difference in CV by bank 
2002–2016 
CV T-test       Shareholders                 UIAHs 
Mean 0.61 0.43 
Variance 0.13 0.04 
Observations 28 28 
Level of Significance 0.05  
t Stat 2.29  
P-Value 0.000  
Standard Deviation 0.36 0.21 
Difference in the coefficient of variation between shareholders and 
UIAHs for returns 2002–2016 where the p-value is smaller than the 
significance level of α (5%), which indicates significant difference in 
risk-adjusted return. 
 
The 10 cases where the CV of UIAH rates of return were higher than those of shareholders are 
those flagged by double asterisks (**) in Table 1. These cases represent more than one-third of 
the sample. In addition, there were 2 cases where the CV of the UIAHs’ rates of return was 
only slightly lower than that of the shareholders’ rates of return. Given these data, the 
proposition that the higher rates of return received by shareholders are justified by being more 
risky than those received by UIAH is not generally borne out, being true in only 61% of the 
cases. This is in spite of the practice of “smoothing” the returns of the UIAH, which, where the 
PER or IRR is used, means that the UIAH are in effect being obliged to “smooth” their own 
returns, while having no control over this process, and with no forgoing by the bank of its 
Mudarib share (except to the extent that appropriations to the PER reduce the amount of profit 
on which the Mudarib percentage share in based). It is worth reiterating that because of the 
commingling of Mudarabah-funded assets with other assets on the bank’s balance sheet, UIAH 
and shareholders are exposed to the same asset risks.   
These findings imply that the CG of IBs is not effective in protecting the interests of UIAH as 
against those of the shareholders. However, it could be argued that the shareholders’ ROE is 
composed partly of retained profits, the value of which is hard to determine in the absence of 
efficient stock markets in which their value would be reflected in the share price.   
The UIAHs returns, being paid out, are more akin to dividends, so that it could be argued that 
a fairer comparison would be between UIAHs’ rates of return and shareholders’ dividend yield 
rates, both on a risk-adjusted basis. Such a comparison is made in Section 6, but does not point 
to conclusions different from those made above. Moreover, the portion of shareholders’ profits 
that are not paid out, i.e. retained profits, presumably offer some benefit to shareholders (even 
if this cannot readily be measured in inefficient stock markets), but not to UIAH. According to 
Hassan et al. (2003), GCC stock markets are relatively small, trade infrequently and at low 
volumes, and there are few listed companies, which indicates a thin market. Also Abdmoulah 
(2010)  found that the GCC markets are highly sensitive to previous stock prices (in the absence 
of ‘random walk’)12, and are thus weak-form inefficient (i.e. not even weak-form efficient) 
markets. 
                                                 
 
12 ‘Random walk’ is a market situation where the future directions of the stocks’ movements cannot be predicted 
on the basis of past movements, i.e. an absence of  serial autocorrelation (Malkiel, 1999).  
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5. Research Methodology 
This section uses a panel data analysis to examine the extent to which certain variables familiar 
from the CG literature help to explain the sizes of the annual differences, bank by bank, 
between the shareholders’ ROEs and the UIAHs’ rates of return (the “spreads” of the rates of 
return). One might expect that stronger CG would be associated with better protection of 
UIAHs’ interests, resulting in smaller spreads between shareholders’ and UIAHs’ rates of 
return. This is what we seek to ascertain. Using dataset of 329 bank-year observations, we run 
regression with panel data, which enables us to fit regression models with adjusted R-squared 
of 70% or more. We use ‘fixed effects’ models13, since  the benefit of using a fixed effects 
model for the spread of the rates of return is that it allows the heterogeneity among individual 
banks to be reflected in the intercept for each bank value (𝛼𝑖) across sectional fixed effects 
(Gujarati, 2012). 
 
 Hausman Test 
It is interesting to see whether fixed effects or a random effects model is more significant or 
more appropriate to use, and better for our data. A Hausman specification test could be 
performed to compare between the two models, to examines if the individual effects are 
uncorrelated with other regressors in the model (Park, 2011).  For example, if individual effects 
are correlated with other regressor, that is random effects would violate a Gauss-Markov 
assumption and the model is no longer BLUE.  
 Hausman Hypothesis Test 
Null hypothesis: Random-effects model is appropriate. 
Alternative hypothesis: fixed effects model is appropriate.  
 
If the null hypothesis is rejected, then the alternative hypothesis or fixed effects model would 
be preferred over random effects model. 
Table 4: Hausman Test 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test 
Equation: RANDOM   
Test cross-section random effects 
     
     Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 13.342346 7 0.0442** 
     
     **The p-value for the Hausman test is less than 5% which indicate that random effects is not appropriate and the 
fixed effects would be a better test.  
 
                                                 
 
13 Based on Hausman Test, see Hausman section  The p-value for the Hausman test is less than 5% which 
indicate that random effects is not appropriate and the fixed effects would be a better test in our model. 
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Therefore, the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis and the use of a fixed effects model 
would be favoured over that of a random effects model to explain the difference in the rates of 
return between shareholders and investment account holders. 
 
 The regression model 
 
Panel (A): Individual Fixed Effects Regression Equation  
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑖𝑡 (𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠’ rate of 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑠 𝑈𝐼𝐴𝐻 rate of 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠) =  𝛼𝑖
+ 𝛽1 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
+ 𝛽3 𝐵𝑂𝐷 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝐺 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑜 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽8 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
 
Panel (B): Regression Equation including the Country Dummy14 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑖𝑡 (𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠’ rate 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑠 𝑈𝐼𝐴𝐻 rate of 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠) =
𝛽1   𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡i𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽3 𝐵𝑂𝐷 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽4 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝐺 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑜 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽7  𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 d𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑘 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  
 
 Dependent Variable 
The difference in rates of return between the shareholders and UIAHs (“spread”) is a variable 
of interest in its own right and also as a proxy for the difference between the CVs. 
 
Return 
Spread 
Represents the dependent variable that is random or stochastic and has a 
normal probability distribution, which is the rate of return difference between 
shareholders and UIAHs in different Islamic banks for the past 15 years. 
A correlation analysis between the size of this spread and the differences in the CVs analysed 
showed a correlation coefficient of -59.2%. Thus, a smaller difference in CVs (such that the 
CV of UIAHs’ rates of return is close to, or even greater than, the CV of shareholders’ rates of 
return) is associated with a higher rate of return difference. 
 Independent Variables 
𝑵𝑶𝑵_𝑬𝑿_𝑫 Ratio of non-executive directors in the Board of Directors (BOD). Proportion 
of non-executive members in the BOD; the data were collected from the 
banks’ annual reports, by dividing the number of non-executive directors by 
the total number of BOD members. 
 
                                                 
 
14 Group A – Bahrain and Malaysia, Group B – Kuwait, Qatar and UAE. 
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CEO Dual CEO Duality; a dummy variable that takes a value of zero in each sample 
bank refer to the absence of a duality role, i.e. that there were a separate Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) and chair, and one otherwise (duality: same chair 
and CEO held simultaneously for the bank). 
B Size The size of the BOD; total number of members on the board. 
CG COMM Existence of a Governance committee, attached to the BOD, as a dummy 
variable. The IFSB Standard on Corporate Governance (IFSB-3) 
recommends the establishment of such a committee to oversee the fair 
treatment of IAH. The dummy takes a value of one in the model when the 
bank has a Governance Committee, and zero otherwise. 
ROAA Return on average assets (net income/total asset) to measure the performance 
of the bank, which shows the profit earned per dollar of assets, reflecting the 
management’s ability to make profits by utilising the bank’s assets to achieve 
a good return. The data on ROAA was taken from the Bankscope database. 
TETA Equity ratio, which is ratio of total equity to total assets, to measure the 
leverage effect. The data was acquired from the banks’ annual reports by 
dividing total equity by total assets. 
TDTA Ratio of total deposits to total assets or the Mudarabah funds ratio 
(UPSIA/total assets). If the bank is financed largely by profit-sharing 
investment accounts, we expect that this might generate a big difference in 
return. The bank may use this leverage to boost the return to shareholders at 
the expense of UIA. Depending on market competition and the Islamic bank’s 
strategy, if the Islamic bank manages to get more UPSIA and pays more 
returns to them, shareholders are expected to receive a better return, other 
things being equal. 
TA Total assets which represent bank size. 
Group B Country dummy variable, which takes a value of one for banks located in 
Bahrain and Malaysia, and zero otherwise. The economic rationale for using 
country dummy variable is that we expect that country would have an effect 
on the difference in rates of return, since Bahrain and Malaysia are better-
regulated countries with more competition, and it would appear that UIAHs 
are treated better there than in other countries. 
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 Descriptive Statistics 
The following table shows the correlation among the explanatory variables that have been used 
in the regression model:  
Table 5: Correlation between variables 
Variables NON_EX_D LS B_SIZE CG_COMM ROAA TETA TDTA TA 
NON_EX_D 1        
CEO Dual -0.1764 1       
B_SIZE 0.0171 0.0844 1      
CG_COMM -0.1119 -0.0940 0.2266 1     
ROAA 0.1589 0.0732 0.0173 -0.0966 1    
TETA 0.0508 0.0047 0.0499 -0.0098 0.5253 1   
TDTA 0.1213 -0.0285 0.0486 0.0832 0.0301 0.0249 1  
TA 0.2068 0.0266 0.0407 0.1448 0.0135 -0.1842 0.2237 1 
The table shows the Pearson correlation coefficient between the explanatory variables. Note that TETA and TDTA 
are somewhat correlated since both denominators are the total assets. 
 
Table 6: Sample statistics 
Variables Mean Median Max Min SD Skewness Kurtosis Jarq-B Prob Obs 
NON_EX_D 0.90 0.89 1.00 0.33 0.11 -2.47 12.06 1472.8 0.00 332 
CEO Dual 0.04 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.20 4.57 21.90 6135.1 0.00 334 
B_SIZE 8.37 9.00 13.00 4.00 1.73 -0.07 3.05 0.28 0.87 332 
CG_COMM 0.27 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.44 1.05 2.10 71.97 0.00 332 
ROAA 0.01 0.01 0.11 -0.12 0.02 0.27 10.76 907.39 0.00 360 
TETA 0.15 0.11 1.00 -0.02 0.13 3.59 20.43 5329.0 0.00 360 
TDTA 11.44 0.69 720.00 0.03 83.34 7.70 61.00 53571.3 0.00 357 
TD 8256.3 4125.9 58681.4 37.6 10580.9 2.44 9.16 927.9 0.00 360 
Descriptive statistics for regression variables. 
The result tables below show that some variables have explanatory power for the difference in 
rates of return between the two classes of stakeholders. What is interesting in the CG variables 
is that CEO duality. On one hand, CEO duality has a positive sign when there is a duality in 
chair and CEO (i.e. the same person chairs the board and is CEO): the UIAHs appear to do 
worse (i.e. the difference is bigger) in that case than when the bank has separate CEO and 
chairperson. For example, if we look at the historical payouts by KFH-Kuwait when they had 
the same chair-CEO, we see that the bank used to give higher rates of return to UIAHs (the 
bank had higher profit as well, and shareholders also received high ROE). But, rather than the 
actual rate of return to UIAHs, we are considering the rate of return to shareholders minus the 
rate of return to UIAHs, and the positive coefficient in CEO duality, meaning the difference is 
bigger when there is a same person as chair and CEO. This finding is in opposition to the theory 
of stewardship discussed earlier and the empirical study by Donaldson and Davis (1991), which 
shows that a single CEO-chair tends to be better, although in our case it is better for UIAHs to 
have separate CEO/chair; however, UIAHs cannot do anything to reward the management. In 
fact, as we discover later, it is mainly the ROAA that is driving the results. 
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Table 7: Panel (A) Individual Fixed Effects with no country dummy 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic15 Prob. 
NON_EX_D -0.0474 0.0250 -1.8993 0.0585** 
CEO Dual 0.0247 0.0124 1.9926 0.0472* 
B_SIZE 0.0017 0.0018 0.9496 0.3431 
CG_COMM -0.0039 0.0050 -0.7857 0.4327 
ROAA 2.6997 0.1346 20.0555 0.0000* 
TETA -0.3383 0.0341 -9.9222 0.0000* 
TDTA 0.0000 0.0000 -1.0705 0.2853 
TA 0.0000 0.0000 -1.1214 0.2630 
R-squared 79%    
Adjusted R-squared 76%    
S.E. of regression 0.0460    
F-statistic 0.1013    
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0956    
Mean dependent variable 31.1230    
S.D. dependent variable 0.0000    
Note: *denotes significance at the 5% level, and **denotes significance at the 10% level, using 
GLS weights to control for heteroscedasticity. Sample period between 2002 and 2016; cross-
sections include 28 banks with a total panel (unbalanced) of 329 observations. Our dataset is 
unbalanced since not all the banks have 15 years of observations; some IBs are relatively new 
or have just converted to being an Islamic bank. 
 
Table 8: Panel (B) Individual Fixed Effects with country effect 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
NON_EX_D 0.0029 0.0186 0.1553 0.8766 
CEO Dual 0.0178 0.0104 1.7014 0.0898** 
B_SIZE -0.0006 0.0011 -0.4829 0.6295 
CG_COMM -0.0161 0.0044 -3.6283 0.0003* 
ROAA 3.1078 0.1296 23.9895 0.0000* 
TETA -0.3872 0.0265 -14.6218 0.0000* 
TDTA 0.0000 0.0000 0.4117 0.6808 
TA 0.0000 0.0000 4.1033 0.0001* 
GROUPB -0.0066 0.0048 -1.3548 0.1764 
R-squared 70%    
Adjusted R-squared 70%    
S.E. of regression 0.0509    
F-statistic 84.5582    
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000    
Mean dependent var 0.1033    
S.D. dependent var 0.1001    
Note: *denotes significance at the 5% level and ** at the 10% level, using GLS weights to 
control for heteroscedasticity. Group B contains Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE. 
 
 
The regression results in the tables above show high goodness of fit, and indicate that some of 
the CG variables were associated with the size of the differences in the rates of return. The 
country dummy was not significant but had the expected sign (Group B countries had higher 
differences). Leadership structure (duality versus non-duality) was influential with or without 
the dummy variable, and had the expected sign (non-duality was associated with lower 
differences).  Board size had no influence, and was not significant although the sign changed 
when the country dummy was introduced. The ratio of non-executive directors also had little 
                                                 
 
15 Care needs to be taken in interpreting t-statistics for panel data because of a potential clustering problem and 
lack of independence of observations. 
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influence, having a small coefficient the sign of which changed when the country dummy was 
introduced. The existence of a Governance Committee was hardly influential, especially in the 
absence of the country dummy, having a small coefficient, but was significant and had a larger 
coefficient with the country dummy, and had the expected sign (its presence being associated 
with smaller differences).   
However, it is the financial variables that display the greatest explanatory power.  Return on 
assets has a large coefficient and a positive sign, which indicates that when the rate of return 
on assets is high, this increases the difference between the shareholders’ rate of return and that 
of the UIAH. In other words, the shareholders receive the lion’s share of the higher profits 
through being given a Mudarib share equal or close to the maximum. When profits are lower, 
the bank reduces its Mudarib share. Total equity to total assets has a negative sign, indicating 
that higher leverage is associated with greater differences between shareholders’ and UIAHs’ 
rates of return.       
These findings imply that the concept of “profit sharing” as applied by IBs in respect of UPSIA 
is far from being straightforward. The division of profits between the shareholders and the 
UIAH appears to depend, to a very significant degree, on the exercise of discretion by the IB’s 
management, taking advantage of the high maximum Mudarib share permitted by contract to 
pass most or all of the benefit of the more profitable years to the shareholders.     
 
6. A Comparison of Shareholders’ Dividend Yield and UIAHs’ Rates of 
Return  
While our examination of profit sharing practices in the sections above raises some issues about 
the fairness of such practices, it could be argued that the profit shares of the shareholders are 
accounting numbers that include a substantial unrealised element in the form of retained profits. 
Yet it is reasonable to assume that the retained profits represent some real benefit to 
shareholders, otherwise it is hard to see why they would be retained rather than distributed. 
Moreover, any such benefit would accrue only to shareholders, not to UIAH. 
Nevertheless, given that the UIAHs’ returns are paid out, because the Islamic bank cannot 
retain UIAH share of profits (except in the PER and IRR), it is of interest to compare the 
UIAHs’ rates of return to the shareholders’ dividend yield rates, on a risk adjusted basis, that 
is, using the CVs of the respective rates of return. Dividend data were available for 20 out of 
the 28 IBs in our sample, as shown in Table 4.6 below. They show that for as many as 7 out of 
the 20 banks, i.e. 35%, the CV of the UIAHs’ payouts is higher than that of the dividend yields. 
(In 2 other cases, the CV of the UIAHs’ return is only slightly lower than that of the dividend 
yield.) This may be considered to be a surprising result, given the practice of “smoothing”. 
However, it indicates that the conclusions one may draw from the examination of profit 
sharing, regarding the inequitable treatment of UIAH in a significant proportion of cases, are 
corroborated by the comparison of UIAHs’ returns and dividend yield rates.   
The overall mean dividend yield rate was 4.0%, compared to the overall mean UIAH rate of 
return of 2.90%. The difference of 110 basis points in favour of the shareholders may perhaps 
be considered as a price paid by UIAH for the asset management services of the bank. However, 
one should recall that the profits out of which the dividends are paid are derived to a substantial 
degree from the Mudarib share of the return on the Mudarabah assets, and, while shareholders 
presumably receive some additional benefit from retained profits, none of this goes to the 
UIAH.  Thus, the bank’s remuneration for asset management is, in general, considerably more 
than 110 basis points. 
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Table 9: Dividend yield and UIAHs 
2002-2016 Dividend yield IAH pay-out 
Bank Mean SD CV Mean SD CV 
BARK 0.04 0.01 24% 0.03 0.02 52%** 
SALM 0.07 0.03 44% 0.02 0.02 104%** 
BAHN 0.04 0.01 36% 0.03 0.01 21% 
ITHM 0.07 0.03 49% 0.04 0.01 26% 
AHLI 0.05 0.02 31% 0.03 0.01 33%** 
KFH 0.03 0.01 31% 0.03 0.02 59% 
KIB 0.02 0.01 55% 0.03 0.01 39% 
MASF 0.06 0.04 57% 0.03 0.02 72%** 
QATR 0.04 0.03 61% 0.04 0.02 51% 
DHABI 0.05 0.03 54% 0.03 0.02 87%** 
DUBAI 0.06 0.03 61% 0.02 0.01 57% 
SHAJ 0.05 0.02 39% 0.03 0.01 43%** 
AFFN 0.02 0.02 65% 0.03 0.01 40% 
ALLN 0.03 0.01 48% 0.03 0.01 22% 
ISLM 0.03 0.02 53% 0.02 0.01 33% 
MUAT 0.02 0.01 54% 0.03 0.00 14% 
CIMB 0.02 0.01 44% 0.03 0.01 35% 
HONG 0.03 0.01 51% 0.03 0.01 16% 
MAY 0.04 0.02 46% 0.03 0.01 35% 
OCBC 0.03 0.01 33% 0.03 0.01 35%** 
Mean 4.0% 
  
2.9% 
  
Source: Bloomberg and Annual Report for % pay-out for 2002-2016. The 
interest here is in how UIAHs’ and shareholders’ rates of return vary with 
respect to their level of risk-adjusted rates of return, not only the different 
levels of the rates of return. To measure the level of risk adjustment is by 
using the CV, which is the SD divided by the mean. As can be seen ** 7 
banks out of 20 the CV of UIAHs’ returns were higher, which indicates 
that UIAHs are not treated fairly per the risk adjusted return.  
 
7.  Summary and Conclusions  
This study undertakes an analysis and comparison of risk-adjusted returns to examine whether, 
in the absence of governance rights, the UIAH are treated equitably compared to shareholders 
in IBs and tests whether the current practice of CG in IBs does balance the rights of UIAHs 
with those of shareholders. One way to look at the governance issues was to examine the 
difference in the rates of return between shareholders and UIAHs. The study also attempted to 
ascertain what drives the difference in the risk-adjusted profit distribution between 
shareholders and UIAHs and the extent to which independent CG variables influence this 
difference.  
The practices of IBs reviewed in Section 2 and the literature reviewed in Section 3 raised some 
important corporate governance issues regarding the fair treatment of UIAH in IBs, given their 
lack of governance rights. The analyses in Section 4 showed that there are indeed reasons to 
believe that in a significant proportion of cases IBs are not treating their UIAH equitably. In 
more than one third of the sample IBs, the risk-adjusted rates of return paid to the UIAH were 
inferior to those accruing to the shareholders, in the form either of ROE or of dividend yield. 
More generally, the practice of profit sharing takes place within a system whereby, thanks to 
the contractual Mudarib share being set as a high maximum rate, the profit share of the UIAH 
is largely at the discretion of the IB’s management, who tend to pay a low rate that is 
comparable to that on a conventional deposit although UIAH are exposed to risks to which 
conventional depositors are not exposed. In effect, UPSIA are typically used by IBs as a form 
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of very low-risk leverage, since the banks do not have any obligation to pay returns to UIAH 
in the absence of profits, and in any case may use reserves taken from prior-year UIAH profits 
to pay returns in years when profits are lacking. In the absence of governance rights, the only 
safeguard UIAH might have would be effective competition between IBs for their funds 
together with transparency and market discipline, but the evidence suggests that these are 
insufficient. The panel data analysis in Section 5 showed that the presence of a Governance 
Committee appears to improve matters somewhat for UIAH, and that in general they seem to 
be slightly better treated in Bahrain and Malaysia, thanks to greater competition and more 
effective regulation; but these effects are small. Consequently, IBs face what might be 
described as an ethical issue in their treatment of UIAH.  
The results have policy implications and should help the supervisory authorities or central 
banks better to understand how IBs are treating UIAHs, which may also help them to evaluate 
the current CG standards and practices. The research also contributes to the existing body of 
knowledge concerning CG in IBs and to filling the gaps in the literature relating to UIAHs’ 
lack of governance rights and lack of transparency, which lead to unfair treatment in terms of 
return and to ambiguity regarding their status and lack of rights.  UIAHs do not have any 
governance rights (other than the right to withdraw their funds) and there is a lack of 
transparency in banks’ dealings with them. The background of the research has centred on the 
issue of the fair treatment of UIAHs from the CG perspective of the rights of stakeholders. As 
the results of the research show, this lack of governance rights and transparency is associated 
not only with unfair treatment in a significant number of cases, but also with ambiguity 
regarding their status and rights.   
The research has useful implications for policymaking, especially as regards the regulation and 
supervision of how UIAHs are paid returns on their funds, which arguably calls for urgent 
reform of the CG of IBs. It sheds light on the effect of UIAHs’ lack of governance rights and 
how they may be exposed to a potential conflict of interest with the management of IBs, ways 
in which management may look after the interests of shareholders at the expense of UIAHs. 
This points to a need to have effective internal governance, such as by establishing CG 
committees attached to the BOD to monitor and act on behalf of PSIA, as recommended by the 
IFSB (although our analysis did not indicate that CG committees had much influence).  There 
is also a need to increase transparency in terms of profit allocation between UPSIA and 
shareholders, to disclose information on the smoothing mechanism, including the use of 
reserves such as PER and IRR. In addition, UIAH could benefit from depositor protection, 
using Takaful-based insurance. 
Islamic finance has the potential to offer a more ethically-based form of financial services 
industry compared to conventional financial services, which have earned a reputation for 
unbridled greed and opportunism in recent years. The IFSB’s IFSB-9 on Conduct of Business, 
as quoted above, provides some pertinent guidelines. However, to live up to that potential it 
would seem that IBs need, among other things, to treat their UIAH more equitably. One 
alternative might be an increasing use of CMT-based term deposits; while on one hand this 
would bring the business model of IBs closer to that of conventional banks it would, on the 
other hand, avoid the governance and ethical problems we describe above16.   
                                                 
 
16 However, this use of CMT-based term deposits raises other difficulties in that some Shari’ah scholars, notably including 
the members of the OIC Fiqh Academy in their resolution of 30 April 2009, take the view that such ‘organised’ uses of 
Commodity Murabahah are not compliant with the Shari’ah. 
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